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Boschen and Weise (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003) model the
probability of a large upturn in in￿ ation. We extend their work to show that openness
to trade exerts a negative e⁄ect on the probability of such an event.
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1 Introduction
In a recent study Boschen and Weise (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2003) model the
probability of a large upturn in in￿ ation during a period of either stable or declining in￿ ation,
an occurrence that they term an ￿ in￿ ation start￿ .1 The results indicate that three factors tend to
precipitate these sustained increases in in￿ ation. First, high rates of real GDP growth increase
the probability of an in￿ ation start, the idea being that rapid growth re￿ ects policy-makers￿
attempts to exploit the short-run Phillips curve, which must eventually lead to higher in￿ ation.
Second, the gap between in￿ ation in the United States and domestic in￿ ation raises the prob-
ability of an in￿ ation start, because in￿ ation shocks in the world￿ s largest economy tend to be
propagated internationally. Third, if a general election takes place in a particular year then the
probability of an in￿ ation start in that year is higher, the interpretation being that government
policies aimed at ￿ buying￿votes are often in￿ ationary. In contrast, oil price hikes, ￿xed exchange
1Throughout the remainder of this note, Boschen and Weise (2003) will be referred to as BW.
1rate regimes, ￿scal policy variables and the political orientation of the government do not exert
a robust e⁄ect on the probability of an in￿ ation start, see BW for further details.
One determinant of the probability of an in￿ ation start that BW do not examine is openness
to international trade. The relationship between openness and the level of in￿ ation has received
a lot of attention in the literature. Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) show that greater trade
openness decreases the time consistent in￿ ation rate through reducing the net marginal bene￿t
of surprise in￿ ation, and both authors present empirical evidence suggesting that openness and
in￿ ation are negatively correlated across countries (Romer (1993) ￿nds that the correlation is
weak amongst a sub-sample of OECD countries, but Lane (1997) shows that it becomes much
stronger after controlling for country size). On the supply-side, greater trade openness is likely
to increase competition in product markets, such that ￿rms with monopoly power are less able
to push through in￿ ationary price increases. Such a mechanism is emphasised in Aron and
Muellbauer (2000), and illustrated using South African data.
In view of the link between the levels of openness and in￿ ation that has been established in
the literature, one might expect openness to trade to exert a negative e⁄ect on the conditional
probability of an in￿ ation start. The purpose of this note is to test that hypothesis using
the methodology introduced by BW. The empirical results show that greater trade openness
decreases the probability of an in￿ ation start, even after one controls for the variables emphasised
by BW. A comparison of di⁄erent model speci￿cations indicates that it is changes in openness
over time, rather than cross-country di⁄erences in openness, that matter for the probability of
an in￿ ation start.
2 Methodology and data
In order to determine the timing of in￿ ation starts, BW ￿rst calculate trend in￿ ation as a centred
nine quarter moving average of actual quarterly in￿ ation. From this series trough (peak) dates
in the in￿ ation process are de￿ned as dates at which trend in￿ ation is lower (higher) than in
the preceding and succeeding four quarters. An in￿ ation episode is then de￿ned as the period
over which trend in￿ ation rises by at least 2% from trough to peak and which is preceded by
four or more quarters of stable or declining in￿ ation. An in￿ ation start is said to occur in the
2year following the year in which a trough occurred.
Using data from 19 OECD countries for the period 1961 ￿ 93, BW identify 73 in￿ ation
starts.2 Binary variables set equal to one in years during which in￿ ation starts occurred and
to zero during years of stable or declining in￿ ation are then created for each country, and these
time series are stacked to produce a single variable. The years during which an in￿ ation upturn
is ongoing, namely the years after an in￿ ation start and up to and including the next in￿ ation
peak, are excluded from the index, i.e. the observations for such years are treated as missing
values, see BW for details.
The in￿ ation starts indicator can be denoted Yit, where i refers to a country and t to a year.
A model for the probability of an in￿ ation start that captures the core variables in the BW
study can then be obtained by estimating the following probit regression:
Pr (Yit = 1 j ￿) = ￿0 + ￿1GDP growthi t￿1 + ￿2INFDUSi t￿1 + ￿3ELECTi t (1)
where ￿ summarises the information set, GDP growth is the annual percentage change in
real GDP, INFDUSi is the annual rate of consumer price in￿ ation in the United States minus
the annual rate of consumer price in￿ ation in country i and ELECT is a dummy variable set
to unity when general elections take place and to zero otherwise.
The new results presented in this note introduce openness to trade as a further covariate
in model (1). Openness is measured as the percentage share of imports of goods and services
in nominal GDP, an approach that is standard in the literature, see Romer (1993). Some
variations on this measure of openness are also considered. As noted above, BW also examined
the role of oil price shocks, exchange rate regimes, ￿scal policy and the political orientation
of the government in determining the probability of an in￿ ation start, but robust supporting
evidence could not be found for any of them. Some of these variables, especially oil price shocks,
are likely to a⁄ect the magnitude of in￿ ation surges, but they do not seem to account for the
timing of the starts of these in￿ ation episodes. In view of this, we do not consider these variables
in testing for a relationship between openness and the probability of an in￿ ation start.
2The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
3The data on in￿ ation starts were extracted from BW and cross checked with data supplied
by Boschen. The data on elections were extracted from Alesina and Roubini (1997), the source
used by BW.3 Data on GDP volumes, consumer prices indices, nominal GDP and nominal
import spending were taken from the International Financial Statistics database, which is also
the source used by BW.
3 Empirical results
In Table 1 we present our empirical results. Regression (1) comprises the core BW variables.
The marginal e⁄ects, calculated at the means of all variables, are positive, and the corresponding
t-ratios are very close to those obtained by BW for comparable model speci￿cations, see, for
instance, Model 7:1 in their paper. The estimates that we obtain are generally smaller in absolute
size than those reported by BW (though the di⁄erences only appear signi￿cant in the case of
GDP growth). This could be due to di⁄erences in speci￿cation (the BW models contain further
variables that are not robustly signi￿cant), or slight di⁄erences in the sample size (the basic
sample used to ￿t the models in Table 1 consists of 377 observations, while the sample used to
￿t Model 7:1 in BW consists of 368 observations). The key point here is that our dataset yields
results qualitatively similar to those in BW.
In regression (2) we add country dummies to regression (1), allowing for some idiosyncratic
element in the probability of an in￿ ation start. The results are robust to this extension of the
model. In regression (3) we condition on the ￿rst lag of openness to trade and the country
dummies. The openness variable is negatively signed and highly signi￿cant, providing strong
support for the proposition that the likelihood of an in￿ ation surge is smaller when an economy
is more open to international trade (the sample is larger in this case due to the exclusion of
INFDUS and hence the addition of U.S. observations, but this is not crucial to the results).
In regression (4) we replace openness with the Hodrick-Prescott trend in openness, which is
calculated separately for each country using a smoothing parameter set to 400, the recommended
value for annual data. The marginal e⁄ect of openness on the probability of an in￿ ation start is
3Alesina and Roubini do not provide information on general elections in Spain. We obtained such information
from the website www.auswaertiges-amt.de.
4slightly smaller in this case, but it is still signi￿cant and supports our main hypothesis. It will be
noted that openness enters once lagged in regressions (3) and (4), to ensure consistency with the
BW approach. If we instead use contemporaneous values of openness in these two regressions
the absolute t-ratios are 1:94 and 2:65 respectively, indicating that the basic correlation is not
especially sensitive to the dynamic structure of the model. In model (5) we add back in the BW
variables. Although the marginal e⁄ect of openness is smaller than in column (3), the e⁄ect
is still highly signi￿cant. If GDP growth is excluded from model (5), the marginal e⁄ect of
openness increases in absolute value to :014 (the absolute t-ratio is 3:49).
What of the quantitative signi￿cance of these estimates? A one standard error increase in
openness reduces the probability of an in￿ ation start by 4:9%.4 The increases in the probability
of an in￿ ation start following one standard error increases in GDP growth and in￿ ation relative
to the US are 9:22% and 11:47% respectively.5 These calculations suggest that although trade
openness makes a non-negligible contribution to the likelihood of an in￿ ation start, its e⁄ects are
less important than those generated by the variables identi￿ed by BW. This may be because one
of the channels through which openness a⁄ects the probability of an in￿ ation start is a reduction
in the propensity for policy-makers to exploit the Phillips curve trade-o⁄, an e⁄ect that BW
control for using the growth rate of real GDP. If the latter term is excluded from column (5), the
reduction in the probability of an in￿ ation start after a one standard error increase in openness
is 7:46%, which is much closer to the size of the e⁄ects estimated for the core BW variables.
In model (6) we exclude the country dummies, which means that the size of the openness
e⁄ect is determined by both the time series variation in the data and the cross-sectional variation
(in models (2)-(5) the country dummies control for the cross-sectional variation). This causes
the openness term to lose signi￿cance, indicating that while increases in openness to trade within
OECD countries are associated with a smaller probability of an in￿ ation start, it is not true
4This calculation is based on the results in column (5). As this speci￿cation contains ￿xed e⁄ects that send
the cross-sectional means of the covariates to zero, the standard error of openness is calculated after controlling
for di⁄erences in average openness across countries. To be precise, it is the residual standard error obtained after
regressing openness on a set of country dummies.
5The standard errors used for these calculations control for cross-sectional di⁄erences in the means of the
variables, but as the means di⁄er relatively little across countries almost identical results follow when using
unconditional standard errors.
5to say that countries with higher average levels of openness experience fewer in￿ ation starts.
This is not surprising when one considers the construction of the in￿ ation starts indicator. As
the years during which an in￿ ation episode is ongoing are excluded from the sample, countries
that experience protracted in￿ ation episodes can only experience a handful of in￿ ation starts
over a 30 year period, e.g. Spain is the most in￿ ation prone country in the sample in the sense
that it has the highest average rate of in￿ ation, yet it experiences just 3 in￿ ation starts between
1960 and 1995, the joint lowest number. Further, the cross-sectional distribution of in￿ ation
starts turns out to be compact (5 countries experience 3 starts, 12 experience 4 starts and 2
experience 5 starts). This means that cross-country di⁄erences in the frequency of in￿ ation
starts are unlikely to correlate with the level of openness, which varies by a factor of 5 across
countries.
In view of these considerations, it makes more sense to analyse the impact of openness on
the chances of an in￿ ation start using time series information, as in models (2)-(5) in Table
1. It is worth noting that if model (6) is augmented with a single country dummy for Japan,
the least open country in the sample, the absolute t-ratio for openness rises to 1:85, which is
signi￿cant at the 7% level. This indicates that one need only introduce very limited controls for
the cross-sectional variation in the data in order to ￿ revive￿the openness e⁄ect. An alternative
approach is to replace the level of openness with the annual percentage change in openness, since
this cleans out cross-sectional variation. We report such a model in column (7), and in column
(8) we report the same model with 5 outlying observations excluded from the sample.6 The
absolute t-ratios for the openness e⁄ects are signi￿cant at the 6% and 2% levels respectively,
and the impact of a one standard error increase in the annual percentage change in openness
is a 4:82% reduction in the probability of an in￿ ation start (calculated using the column (8)
estimates). These results show that even when country dummies are omitted from the model,
some measure of trade openness a⁄ects the probability of an in￿ ation start.
Insert Table 1 about here.
6The ￿ve observations are the two largest absolute readings for the percentage change in openness, the two
largest absolute readings for INFDUS and the largest absolute reading for GDP growth (the second largest
reading is already outside the sample because it occurs when an in￿ ation episode is ongoing).
6We estimated three further speci￿cations that are not reported in Table 1. First,we aug-
mented model (5) with 18 linear time trends, one for each of the countries included in the sample.
The purpose of this step was to control for any trends in openness and the frequency of in￿ ation
starts that are common to both variables, and which may be inducing spurious correlations. The
absolute t-ratio on openness falls slightly to 2:35, but is still signi￿cant at the conventional level.
Second, we added time dummies to the model in order to check that the statistical signi￿cance
of openness is not dependent on some short time interval during which lots of countries experi-
enced in￿ ation starts, e.g. 13 countries experienced an in￿ ation start in 1979. The time dummy
for 1961 was omitted to avoid multicollinearity and those for 1974￿76, 1980￿83, and 1989￿93
were omitted because no in￿ ation starts occurred during those years, meaning that numerical
optimisation problems arise when the corresponding time dummies are included in the model.
The absolute t-ratio on openness in this speci￿cation was 2:26, con￿rming the robustness of our
main ￿nding. Third, we took a logit estimate of model (5) in Table 1. This gave an absolute
t-ratio for openness of 2:53, and thus supports the result established in Table 1.
4 Summary
This note hypothesised a negative link between trade openness and the probability of a large
upturn in in￿ ation. This could arise because high levels of openness reduce the incentive for
policy-makers to pursue expansionary policies, or because strong foreign competition limits the
ability of price-setting ￿rms to push through price increases. A range of probit regressions
￿tted using OECD data showed empirical support for this conjecture. A comparison of di⁄erent
speci￿cations indicated that the negative correlation between openness and the probability of an
in￿ ation start arises because of the time series variation in the OECD panel rather than because
of the cross-sectional variation.
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